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Abstract
We study the design of optimal mechanisms in a setting where job-agents compete
for being processed by a service provider that can handle one job at a time. Each
job has a processing time and incurs a waiting cost. Jobs need to be compensated
for waiting. We consider two models, one where only the waiting costs of jobs are
private information (1-d), and another where both waiting costs and processing times
are private (2-d). Probability distributions represent the public common belief about
private information. We consider discrete and continuous distributions. In this setting,
an optimal mechanism minimizes the total expected expenses to compensate all jobs,
while it has to be Bayes-Nash incentive compatible. We derive closed formulae for the
optimal mechanism in the 1-d case and show that it is efficient for symmetric jobs. For
non-symmetric jobs, we show that efficient mechanisms perform arbitrarily bad. For
the 2-d discrete case, we prove that the optimal mechanism in general does not even
satisfy IIA, the ‘independent of irrelevant alternatives’ condition. Hence any attempt
along the lines of the classical auction setting is doomed to fail. In the 2-d discrete case,
we also show that the optimal mechanism is not even efficient for symmetric agents.
1Maastricht University, Quantitative Economics, P.O.Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands.
Email:{b.heydenreich,r.muller}@ke.unimaas.nl
∗Supported by NWO grant 2004/03545/MaGW ‘Local Decisions in Decentralised Planning Environments’.
2Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, 7, S.J.S. Sansanwal Marg, New Delhi - 110 016, India.
Email:dmishra@isid.ac.in
3University of Twente, Applied Mathematics, P.O. Box 217, 7500 AE Enschede, The Netherlands. Email:
m.uetz@utwente.nl
1
1 Introduction
The design of optimal auctions is recognized as an intriguing issue in auction theory; first
studied by Myerson (1981) for the case of single item auctions. In that setting, the goal is to
maximize the seller’s revenue. We study the design of optimal auctions (or more precisely,
mechanisms) in a setting where job-agents compete for being processed by a service provider
that can only handle one job at a time. No job can be interrupted once started, and each job is
characterized by service time and weight, the latter representing his disutility for waiting per
unit time. It is well known that the total disutility of the jobs is minimized by a scheduling
policy known as Smith’s rule: schedule jobs in order of non-increasing ratios of weight over
service time (Smith 1956).
Our Contribution. We consider different cases. In the one-dimensional (1-d) case, jobs’
processing times are public information and a job’s weight is only known to the job itself.
We further distinguish between the discrete and continuous case. Publicly known probability
distributions over a finite set of possible weights represent common beliefs about the weights
in the discrete case. For the continuous case, we regard continuous probability distributions.
In the two-dimensional (2-d) case, both weights and processing times are private information
of the jobs. For all different settings, we aim at finding Bayes-Nash incentive compatible
mechanisms that minimize the expected expenses of the service provider. Given jobs’ reports
about their private information, a mechanism determines both an order in which jobs are
served, and for each job a payment that the job receives. The payment can be seen as a
compensation for waiting. By a graph theoretic interpretation of the incentive compatibility
constraints - as used e.g. by Rochet (1987) and in Malakhov and Vohra (2007) - we show
how to derive optimal mechanisms. For the one-dimensional discrete and continuous case,
we obtain closed formulae for modified job weights, and show that serving the jobs in the
order of non-increasing ratios of these modified weights over service times is optimal for
the service provider, as long as a certain regularity condition is fulfilled. It turns out that
the optimal mechanism is not necessarily efficient, i.e., in general it does not maximize
total utility. But it does so if e.g. all jobs are symmetric. For non-symmetric jobs with
discrete weights, we show by example that the cost can be arbitrarily far from optimal if
we insist on efficiency. We also compare our optimal mechanism to the generalized VCG
mechanism and see that for discrete weights, expected payments differ even for the case
of symmetric jobs. For continuous weights, however, revenue equivalence applies and the
generalized VCG mechanism is an optimal mechanism for symmetric jobs. Furthermore, we
analyze a mechanism in the continuous setting that corresponds to the first price auction
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and we show that this yields another optimal mechanism. For the two-dimensional discrete
case, our main result is that the optimal mechanism generally does not satisfy a property
called IIA, ‘independence of irrelevant alternatives’. From that we conclude that the optimal
mechanism cannot be expressed in terms of modified weights along the lines of the 1-d case. In
fact, any kind of priority based list scheduling algorithm where the priorities of a job depend
only on the characteristics of that job itself cannot in general be an optimal mechanism. We
conclude that optimal mechanism design for the two-dimensional case is substantially more
involved than two-dimensional mechanism design for auction settings, as studied in Malakhov
and Vohra (2007). We also show that even for symmetric jobs, in the 2-d case the optimal
mechanism is not efficient.
Related Work. Optimal mechanism design goes back to Myerson (1981). He studies
optimal mechanisms for single item auctions and continuous 1-dimensional type spaces. Here,
optimal auctions are modifications of efficient auctions, more specifically, modifications of the
Vickrey auction. When regarding the seller as additional agent who bids zero in the original
auction, his modified bid might be non-zero in the optimal auction yielding a reservation
price. Malakhov and Vohra (2007) regard optimal mechanisms for an auction setting with
discrete 2-dimensional type spaces. The derived optimal mechanisms again employ the effi-
cient allocation rule with modified bids. As Malakhov and Vohra (2007), we follow Myerson’s
approach and analyze in how far it also works in a simple scheduling setting. We observe
similarities and differences, see Section 3. Especially, we show that for 2-dimensional type
spaces the traditional approach must fail to determine an optimal auction. The fact that
multi-dimensional optimal mechanism design is harder than that for 1-dimensional types,
is well-known. For example, Armstrong (2000) studies a multi-object auction model where
valuations are additive and drawn from a binary distribution (i.e., high or low). He gives
optimal auctions under specific conditions that reduce the type graph. From this paper it
becomes evident that optimal mechanism design with multi-dimensional discrete types is
difficult. For our model, we formalize this difficulty by showing that traditional approaches
inevitably yield IIA-mechanisms and that in some cases none of these is optimal. For de-
tails, we refer to Section 4. In Hartline and Karlin (2007), the authors give an introduction
to optimal mechanism design with 1-dimensional continuous types under dominant strategy
incentive compatibility. Both Myerson’s and our optimal allocation rules turn out to be
dominant strategy implementable as well, while they yield optimal mechanisms in the larger
class of Bayes-Nash incentive compatible mechanisms. Other scheduling models have been
looked at from a different angle in the economic literature. See, e.g., Mitra (2001) for effi-
cient and budget-balanced mechanism design in a 1-dimensional model and Moulin (2007)
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for mechanisms that prevent merging and splitting of jobs.
Organization. In Section 2, we study the 1-d discrete case and derive closed formulae
for the optimal mechanism. We compare the optimal to efficient mechanisms in Section 3.
In Section 4, we study the 2-d discrete case and show that known approaches are doomed to
fail here. The continuous case is studied in Section 5 and standard auction formats for the
continuous scheduling model are analyzed in Section 6. We conclude with Section 7.
2 Optimal Mechanisms for the 1-Dimensional Setting
2.1 Setting and Preliminaries
Consider a single machine which can handle one job at a time. Let J = {1, . . . , n} denote
the set of jobs. We regard jobs as selfish agents that act strategically. Each job j has a
processing time pj and a weight wj. While pj is publicly known, the actual wj is private
information to job j. We refer to the private information of a job as its type. Jobs share
common beliefs about other jobs’ types in terms of probability distributions. We assume
discrete distribution of weights, that is, agent j’s weight wj follows a probability distribution
over the discrete set Wj = {w1j , . . . , wmjj } ⊂ R, where w1j < · · · < wmjj . Let ϕj be the
probability distribution of wj, that is, ϕj(w
i
j) denotes the probability associated with w
i
j for
i = 1, . . . ,mj. Let Φj(w
i
j) =
∑i
k=1 ϕj(w
k
j ) be the cumulative probability up to w
i
j. Both ϕj
and Φj are public information. We assume that jobs’ weights are independently distributed.
Let us denote by W = Πj∈JWj the set of all type profiles. For any job j, let W−j = Πk 6=jWk.
Let ϕ be the joint probability distribution of w = (w1, . . . , wn). Then ϕ(w) = Π
n
j=1ϕj(w
ij
j )
for w = (wi11 , . . . , w
in
n ) ∈ W . Let w−j and ϕ−j be defined analogously. For wij ∈ Wj and
w−j ∈ W−j, we denote by (wij, w−j) the type profile where job j has type wij and the types
of all other jobs are w−j.
A direct revelation mechanisms consists of an allocation rule f and a payment scheme
pi. Jobs have to report their weights and they might report untruthfully if it suits them.
Depending on those reports, the allocation rule selects a schedule, i.e. an order in which jobs
are processed on the machine. The payment scheme assigns a payment that is made to jobs
in order to reimburse them for their waiting cost.
Let S = {σ | σ is a permutation of (1, . . . , n)} denote the set of all feasible schedules.
Then the allocation rule is a mapping f : W → S. For any schedule σ ∈ S, let σj be the
position of job j in the ordering of jobs in σ. Then, by Sj(σ) =
∑
σk<σj
pk, we denote the
start time or waiting time of job j in σ. If job j has waiting time Sj and actual weight
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wij, it encounters a valuation of −wijSj. If j additionally receives payment pij, his total
utility is pij − wijSj, i.e., we assume quasi-linear utilities. Let us denote by ESj(f, wij) :=∑
w−j∈W−j Sj(f(w
i
j, w−j))ϕ−j(w−j) the expected waiting time of job j if it reports weight w
i
j
and allocation rule f is applied. Denote by Epij(w
i
j) :=
∑
w−j∈W−j pij(w
i
j, w−j)ϕ−j(w−j) the
expected payment to j. We assume that jobs aim at maximizing their expected utility.
Definition 1 A mechanism (f, pi) is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible if for every agent j
and every two types wij,w
k
j ∈ Wj
Epij(w
i
j)− wijESj(f, wij) ≥ Epij(wkj )− wijESj(f, wkj ) (1)
under the assumption that all agents apart from j report truthfully. If for allocation rule f
there exists a payment scheme pi such that (f, pi) is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible, then f
is called Bayes-Nash implementable. The payment scheme pi is referred to as an incentive
compatible payment scheme.
In order to account for individual rationality, we need to guarantee non-negative util-
ities for all agents that report their true weight. It will be convenient to ensure indi-
vidual rationality by introducing a so-called dummy weight w
mj+1
j , which we add to the
type space Wj for every agent j. We assume ESj(f, w
mj+1
j ) = 0 and Epij(w
mj+1
j ) = 0
for all j ∈ J . Furthermore, we impose the incentive constraints Epij(wij) − wijESj(f, wij) ≥
Epij(w
mj+1
j )−wijESj(f, wmj+1j ), which imply that Epij(wij)−wijESj(f, wij) ≥ 0 for any Bayes-
Nash incentive compatible mechanism (f, pi). Therefore, the dummy weights together with
the mentioned assumptions guarantee that individual rationality is satisfied along with the
incentive constraints. The dummy weight can be interpreted as an option for any job not to
take part in the mechanism.
We next define the notion of monotonicity w.r.t. weights, which is easily shown to be a
necessary condition for Bayes-Nash implementability. In our setting, it is even a sufficient
condition.
Definition 2 An allocation rule f satisfies monotonicity w.r.t. weights or short monotonic-
ity if for every agent j ∈ J , wij < wkj implies that ESj(f, wij) ≥ ESj(f, wkj ).
Theorem 1 An allocation rule f is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible if and only if it satisfies
monotonicity w.r.t. weights.
Before we give a proof of Theorem 1, we introduce the type graph for the Bayes-Nash
setting. Tf has node set Wj and contains an arc from any node w
i
j to any other node w
k
j of
length
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`ik = w
i
j[ESj(f, w
k
j )− ESj(f, wij)].
Here, `ik represents the gain in expected valuation for agent j by truthfully reporting type
wij instead of lying type w
k
j . The incentive constraints for a Bayes-Nash incentive compatible
mechanism (f, pi) and job j can be read as
Epij(w
k
j ) ≤ Epij(wij) + wij[ESj(f, wkj )− ESj(f, wij)] = Epij(wij) + `ik.
That is, the expected payments Epij(·) constitute a node potential in Tf . According to Mu¨ller,
Perea, and Wolf (2007), Bayes-Nash implementability of an allocation rule f is equivalent
to the non-negative cycle property of the type graph Tf for any agent j. Monotonicity is
equivalent to the fact that there is no negative cycle consisting of only two arcs in Tf . We
call this property the non-negative two-cycle property. It follows from
`ik + `ki = w
i
j[ESj(f, w
k
j )− ESj(f, wij)] + wkj [ESj(f, wij)− ESj(f, wkj )]
= (wij − wkj )[ESj(f, wkj )− ESj(f, wij)].
The last term is non-negative for all jobs j and any two types wij and w
k
j if and only if
monotonicity holds.
Proof (Theorem 1). All that remains to show is that the non-negative two-cycle property
implies the non-negative cycle property. We first show that the arc lengths satisfy a property
called decomposition monotonicity, i.e., whenever i < k < l then `ik+ `kl ≤ `il and `lk+ `ki ≤
`li. From that property follows that the length of any cycle can be lower bounded by the
lengths of a number of two cycles, which proves the theorem.
Decomposition monotonicity follows from
`ik + `kl = w
i
j[ESj(f, w
k
j )− ESj(f, wij)] + wkj [ESj(f, wlj)− ESj(f, wkj )]
≤ wij[ESj(f, wkj )− ESj(f, wij)] + wij[ESj(f, wlj)− ESj(f, wkj )]
= wij[ESj(f, w
l
j)− ESj(f, wij)]
= `il,
where the inequality follows from monotonicity. Note that everything remains true if the
dummy type is involved, i.e., if l = mj + 1. The inequality `lk + `ki ≤ `li follows similarly.
In order to prove the second claim, consider a finite cycle c with nodes c1 to ck and
rename the nodes such that c1 < c2 < · · · < ck. Replace every arc (cu, cv) with u < v
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by arcs (cu, cu+1), (cu+1, cu+2), . . . , (cv−1, cv). Do the same for all arcs (cv, cu) with u < v.
Call the resulting cycle c′. The cycle length of c′ is less than or equal to the length of c,
due to decomposition monotonicity. The new cycle c′ consists only of two-cycles. Due to
monotonicity, those have non-negative length. Hence, c has non-negative length as well. ¤
2.2 Optimal Mechanisms
Let us start by investigating the efficient allocation rule for the given setting, i.e., the allo-
cation rule that maximizes the total valuation of agents. It is well known that scheduling
in order of non-increasing weight over processing time ratios minimizes the sum of weighted
start times
∑n
j=1wjSj(f(w)) for any type profile w ∈ W , and therefore maximizes the total
valuation of all agents. This allocation rule is known as Smith’s rule (Smith 1956). The op-
timal mechanism that we derive deploys a slightly different allocation rule, namely Smith’s
rule with respect to certain modified weights.
Our goal is to set up a mechanism that is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible and among
all such mechanisms minimizes the expected total payment that has to be made to the jobs.
Given any Bayes-Nash incentive compatible mechanism (f, pi), one can obviously substitute
the payment scheme by its expected payment scheme yielding (f, Epi(·)) without loosing
Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility. Moreover, the expected total payment to the agents
remains unchanged under the substitution. Therefore, we restrict focus to mechanisms in
which agents always receive a payment which is independent of the specific report of the
other agents and of the actual allocation.
Note that, unlike e.g. in Myerson (1981), in the discrete setting considered here revenue
equivalence does not hold. Therefore, there are possibly multiple payment schemes that
make an allocation rule incentive compatible. Let f be an allocation rule and let pif (·) be
a payment scheme that minimizes expected expenses for the machine among all payment
schemes that make f Bayes-Nash incentive compatible. More specifically, pifj (w
i
j) denotes the
payment to agent j declaring weight wij under this optimal payment scheme. Let P
min(f) =∑
j∈J
∑
wij∈Wj ϕj(w
i
j)pi
f
j (w
i
j) be the minimum expected total expenses for allocation rule f .
The following lemma specifies the optimal payment scheme for a given allocation rule.
Lemma 1 For a Bayes-Nash implementable allocation rule f , the payment scheme defined
by
pifj (w
mj+1
j ) = 0, pi
f
j (w
i
j) =
mj∑
k=i
wkj [ESj(f, w
k
j )− ESj(f, wk+1j )] for i = 1, . . . ,mj
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is incentive compatible, individually rational and minimizes the expected total payment made
to agents. The corresponding expected total payment is given by
Pmin(f) =
∑
j∈J
mj∑
i=1
ϕj(w
i
j)w
i
jESj(f, w
i
j),
where the modified weights wj are defined as follows
w1j = w
1
j , w
i
j = w
i
j + (w
i
j − wi−1j )
Φj(w
i−1
j )
ϕj(wij)
for i = 2, . . . ,mj.
Proof. Let p = (wij = a0, a1, . . . , am = w
mj+1
j ) denote a path from w
i
j to w
mj+1
j in the
type graph Tf for agent j. Denote by length(p) the sum of its arc lengths. Let (f, pi) be a
Bayes-Nash incentive compatible mechanism. Adding up the incentive constraints
Epij(ai) ≤ Epij(ai−1) + ai−1[ESj(f, ai)− ESj(f, ai−1)] = Epij(ai−1) + `ai−1ai
for i = 1, . . . ,m yields
Epij(w
mj+1
j ) ≤ Epij(wij) + length(p).
Assuming Epij(w
mj+1
j ) = 0, this is equivalent to −length(p) ≤ Epij(wij). As f is Bayes-Nash
implementable, Tf satisfies the non-negative cycle property. Consequently, we can compute
shortest paths in Tf . With dist(w
i
j, w
mj+1
j ) being the length of a shortest path from w
i
j to
w
mj+1
j , the above yields −dist(wij, wmj+1j ) ≤ Epij(wij). Therefore, −dist(wij, wmj+1j ) is a lower
bound on the expected payment for reporting wij. On the other hand, since we have
dist(wij, w
mj+1
j ) ≤ `ik + dist(wkj , wmj+1j )
for any two types wij and w
k
j , it follows that
−dist(wkj , wmj+1j ) ≤ −dist(wij, wmj+1j ) + `ik.
Consequently, −dist(·, wmj+1j ) defines a node potential in Tf . Setting pifj (wij) =
−dist(wij, wmj+1j ) therefore yields an incentive compatible payment scheme that minimizes
the expected payment to every agent for any reported type of the agent. Consequently, this
payment scheme also minimizes the expected total payment to agents. Recall that individual
rationality is satisfied along with the incentive constraints.
Since arc lengths in Tf satisfy decomposition monotonicity, a shortest path from w
i
j
to w
mj+1
j is the path that includes all intermediate nodes w
i+1
j , . . . , w
mj . Observing that
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−dist(wmj+1j , wmj+1j ) = 0 and −dist(wij, wmj+1j ) =
∑mj
k=iw
k
j [ESj(f, w
k
j )−ESj(f, wk+1j )]∀wij ∈
Wj \ {wmj+1j } proves the first claim.
Next, we compute the minimum expected total payment for allocation rule f .
Pmin(f) =
∑
j∈J
mj∑
i=1
ϕj(w
i
j)pi
f
j (w
i
j)
=
∑
j∈J
mj∑
i=1
ϕj(w
i
j)
mj∑
k=i
wkj [ESj(f, w
k
j )− ESj(f, wk+1j )]
=
∑
j∈J
mj∑
i=1
ϕj(w
i
j)
(
mj∑
k=i
wkjESj(f, w
k
j )−
mj∑
k=i+1
wk−1j ESj(f, w
k
j )
)
=
∑
j∈J
mj∑
i=1
ϕj(w
i
j)
(
wijESj(f, w
i
j) +
mj∑
k=i+1
ESj(f, w
k
j )(w
k
j − wk−1j )
)
=
∑
j∈J
ESj(f, w
1
j )w
1
jϕj(w
1
j )
+
∑
j∈J
mj∑
i=2
ESj(f, w
i
j)
(
ϕj(w
i
j)w
i
j + (w
i
j − wi−1j )
i−1∑
k=1
ϕj(w
k
j )
)
=
∑
j∈J
ESj(f, w
1
j )w
1
jϕj(w
1
j )
+
∑
j∈J
mj∑
i=2
ESj(f, w
i
j)
(
Φj(w
i
j)w
i
j − Φj(wi−1j )wi−1j
)
Let us define modified weights wj by setting w
1
j = w
1
j and for i = 2, . . . ,mj
wij =
wijΦj(w
i
j)− wi−1j Φj(wi−1j )
ϕj(wij)
=
wijϕj(w
i
j) + w
i
jΦj(w
i−1
j )− wi−1j Φj(wi−1j )
ϕj(wij)
= wij + (w
i
j − wi−1j )
Φj(w
i−1
j )
ϕj(wij)
.
This yields
Pmin(f) =
∑
j∈J
mj∑
i=1
ϕj(w
i
j)w
i
jESj(f, w
i
j).
¤
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Given the minimum payments per allocation rule, we want to specify the allocation rule
f which minimizes Pmin(f) among all Bayes-Nash implementable allocation rules.
Definition 3 If f ∈ argmin{Pmin(f) | f : W → S, f Bayes-Nash implementable}, then we
call the mechanism (f, pif ) an optimal mechanism.
We will need the following regularity condition that ensures Bayes-Nash implementability
of the allocation rule in our optimal mechanism.
Definition 4 We say that regularity is satisfied if for every agent j and i = 2, . . . ,mj − 1
wij + (w
i
j − wi−1j )
Φj(w
i−1
j )
ϕj(wij)
≤ wi+1j + (wi+1j − wij)
Φj(w
i
j)
ϕj(w
i+1
j )
.
This implies that wij < w
k
j whenever w
i
j < w
k
j .
Note that regularity is satisfied e.g. if the differences wij − wi−1j are constant and the distri-
bution has a non-increasing reverse hazard rate4.
Theorem 2 Let the modified weights be defined as in Lemma 1. Let f be the allocation rule
that schedules jobs in order of non-increasing ratios wj/pj. If regularity holds, then (f, pi
f )
is an optimal mechanism.
Proof. We show that f is Bayes-Nash implementable and minimizes Pmin(f) among all Bayes-
Nash implementable allocation rules. For any allocation rule f , we can rewrite Pmin(f) as
follows, using independence of weight distributions. Let W ′j = Wj \ {wmj+1j } and W ′ =
Πj∈JW ′j .
Pmin(f) =
∑
j∈J
∑
wij∈W ′j
ϕj(w
i
j)w
i
jESj(f, w
i
j)
=
∑
j∈J
∑
wij∈W ′j
ϕj(w
i
j)w
i
j
∑
w−j∈W−j
Sj(f(w
i
j, w−j))ϕ−j(w−j)
=
∑
j∈J
∑
(wij ,w−j)∈W ′
ϕ(wij, w−j)w
i
jSj(f(w
i
j, w−j))
=
∑
w∈W ′
ϕ(w)
∑
j∈J
wjSj(f(w)).
4The reverse hazard rate of the distribution with pdf ϕ and cdf Φ is defined as ϕ(x)/Φ(x), see e.g. Krishna
(2002).
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Thus, Pmin(f) can be minimized by minimizing
∑
j∈J wjSj(f(w)) for every reported type
profile w. This is achieved by using Smith’s rule with respect to modified weights, i.e.,
scheduling in order of non-increasing ratios wj/pj. Under Smith’s rule, the expected start
time ESj(wj) is clearly non-increasing in the modified weight wj. The regularity condition
ensures that it is non-increasing in the original weights wj. Therefore, Smith’s rule with
respect to modified weights satisfies monotonicity and is hence Bayes-Nash implementable
by Theorem 1. This completes the proof. ¤
3 Optimality versus Efficiency
For symmetric agents the optimal and the efficient allocation coincide.
Corollary 1 If agents are symmetric, i.e. W1 = · · · = Wn, ϕ1 = · · · = ϕn and p1 = · · · = pn
and if distributions are such that regularity holds, then the optimal mechanism is efficient.
Proof. If W1 = · · · = Wn = {w1, . . . , wm} and ϕ1 = · · · = ϕn, then for any two agents j1 and
j2, and i = 1, . . . ,m, the modified weights are equal, i.e. w
i
j1
= wij2 . Since processing times
are also equal and since regularity guarantees that modified weights are increasing in the
original weights, scheduling jobs in order of their non-increasing ratios wj/pj is equivalent to
scheduling them in order of their non-increasing ratios wj/pj. That is, the efficient allocation
rule and the allocation rule from the optimal mechanism in Theorem2 coincide. ¤
If weight distributions differ among agents or if agents have different processing times,
then the optimal mechanism is in general not efficient. In fact, when restricting to efficient
mechanisms, the total expected payment can be arbitrarily bad in comparison to the optimal
one. This is illustrated by the following two examples.
Example 1 Let there be two jobs 1 and 2 with W1 = {M + 1} and W2 = {1,M} for some
constant M . Let ϕ2(1) = 1− 1/M , ϕ2(M) = 1/M and p1 = p2 = 1. Let Eff be the efficient
and Opt be the optimal allocation rule. Then the ratio Pmin(Eff)/Pmin(Opt) goes to infinity
as M goes to infinity.
Proof. The efficient allocation rule, Smith’s rule, always allocates job 1 first. So the optimal
payment for Smith’s rule is to pay 0 to job 1 and to pay M to job 2, irrespective of its type.
The minimum expected total payment is hence Pmin(Eff) =M .
For the optimal allocation, we compute modified weights after Lemma 1: w11 = w
1
1 =
M + 1, w12 = w
1
2 = 1 and w
2
2 =M + (M − 1)(1− 1/M)/(1/M) =M2 −M + 1. The latter is
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larger thanM+1 ifM > 2. Therefore, job 2 is scheduled in front of job 1 if he has weightM
and behind if he has weight 1. The expected start times for job 2 are ES2(Opt, 1) = 1 and
ES2(Opt,M) = 0, respectively. Optimal payments according to Lemma 1 are pi
Opt
2 (1) = 1
and piOpt2 (M) = 0. For job 1, the expected start time is ES1(Opt,M + 1) = 1/M and the
expected payment piOpt1 (M+1) = 1+1/M . Hence, P
min(Opt) = 1+1/M+1 · (1−1/M) = 2.
Consequently, Pmin(Eff)/Pmin(Opt) =M/2, which tends to infinity ifM goes to infinity.
¤
Remark 1 In the above, the ratio of the expected payments of the efficient versus the optimal
allocation rule is analyzed. Similarly, we can derive that the expected ratio of the payments
tends to infinity as M approaches infinity. The latter is slightly more technical.
Example 2 Let there be two jobs 1 and 2 with the same weight distribution W1 = W2 =
{1,M}, ϕj(1) = 1−1/M , ϕj(M) = 1/M for j = 1, 2. Let p1 = 1/2 and p2 =M/2+1. Let Eff
be the efficient and Opt be the optimal allocation rule. Then the ratio Pmin(Eff)/Pmin(Opt)
goes to infinity as M goes to infinity.
Proof. The efficient allocation rule always schedules job 1 first, since 1/(1/2) = 2 > 2M/(M+
2) = M/(M/2 + 1). Therefore, the expected start time of job 1 is 0 and that of job 2 is
1/2. Optimal payments according to Lemma 1 are piEff1 (1) = pi
Eff
1 (M) = 0 and pi
Eff
2 (1) =
piEff2 (1) =M/2. Hence, P
min(Eff) =M/2.
For the optimal mechanism, we compute modified weights as w11 = w
1
2 = 1 and w
2
1 =
w22 = M
2 − M + 1. Job 1 is scheduled first, whenever both jobs have the same weight
or job 1 has a larger weight than job 2. In the case where job 1 has (modified) weight
1 and job 2 has modified weight M2 − M + 1, job 2 is scheduled first for M > 2, since
1/(1/2) < (M2 −M + 1)/(M/2 + 1). The resulting expected start times and payments are
given below:
ES1(Opt, 1) = 1/2 + 1/M
ES1(Opt,M) = 0
ES2(Opt, 1) = 1/2
ES2(Opt,M) = 1/(2M)
piOpt1 (1) = 1/2 + 1/M
piOpt1 (M) = 0
piOpt2 (1) = 1− 1/(2M)
piOpt2 (M) = 1/2.
Hence,
Pmin(Opt) = (
1
2
+
1
M
)(1− 1
M
) + (1− 1
2M
)(1− 1
M
) +
1
2
· 1
M
= (1− 1
M
)(
3
2
+
1
2M
) +
1
2
· 1
M
.
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Thus, the ratio Pmin(Eff)/Pmin(Opt) tends to infinity if M tends to infinity. ¤
Remark 2 As in the first example, it can be shown that also that the expected ratio of the
payments tends to infinity as M approaches infinity.
Comparison to Myerson’s result. For the single item auction and continuous type
spaces, Myerson (1981) has made similar observations: in his setting, the Vickrey auction is
an efficient auction. The optimal auction can be seen as a modified Vickrey auction with the
seller submitting a bit himself. In our setting also, the allocation in the optimal mechanism
is equivalent to the efficient allocation rule with respect to modified data. Nevertheless,
in Myerson (1981) the optimal and the efficient mechanism may differ. For the single item
auction this can be due to the seller keeping the item (even in the symmetric case) or because
a bidder that has not submitted the highest bid can get the item in the asymmetric case. In
our setting, the optimal and the efficient mechanism can only differ if agents are asymmetric,
see Corollary 1 and Examples 1 and 2.
On the generalized VCGMechanism. The VCGmechanism is due to Vickrey (1961),
Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973). The allocation rule is the efficient one. In our setting this
means scheduling in order of non-increasing ratios wj/pj. The payment scheme pays to agent
j an amount that is equal to an appropriate constant (possibly depending on other agents’
types, but not on j’s type) minus the total loss in valuation of the other agents due to j’s
presence. For agent j with processing time pj, the total loss in valuation of the other agents
is equal to the product of pj and the total weight of all agents processed after j. In order to
ensure individual rationality, we have to add pj times the total weight of all agents except j.
Therefore, the resulting payment to j for reported type profile w and efficient schedule σ is
equal to
piV CGj (w) = pj
∑
k∈J
σk<σj
wk.
As illustrated by examples 1 and 2, the allocation of the VCG mechanism can differ from
the allocation of the optimal mechanism if agents are not symmetric. Moreover, if agents
are symmetric, the VCG mechanism still can be non-optimal in terms of payments. This is
illustrated by the following example.
Example 3 There are two symmetric agents with W1 = W2 = {w1, w2}, w1 < w2, and
ϕj(w
1) = ϕj(w
2) = 1/2 for j = 1, 2. Processing times are equal and without loss of generality
p1 = p2 = 1. Then the expected expenses of the VCG mechanism are strictly higher than
those of the optimal mechanism.
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Proof. Regularity is trivially satisfied and therefore the allocation of the optimal mechanism
from Section 2 is efficient. There are four possible type profiles, each occurring with prob-
ability 1/4: (w1, w1), (w1, w2), (w2, w1), (w2, w2). The resulting schedules are the same for
the VCG and the optimal mechanism and schedule the job with the higher weight first or
randomize uniformly in the case of equal weights, respectively. Let us first compute the ex-
pected total payment for the VCG mechanism. The VCG mechanism pays to the job that is
scheduled last the weight of the job that is scheduled before him. Thus, the VCG mechanism
has to spend w1 in the first case, and w2 in the second, third and fourth case, respectively.
The total expected payment of the VCG mechanism is hence (3w2+w1)/4. Let (f, pif ) denote
the optimal mechanism from Section 2. In the optimal mechanism, the expected payment to
a job with weight w1 is equal to Epifj (w
1) = w1[ESj(f, w
1)− ESj(f, w2)] + w2ESj(f, w2) =
w1[3/4 − 1/4] + w2[1/4] = w1/2 + w2/4. The expected payment to a job with weight w2 is
Epifj (w
2) = w2ESj(f, w
2) = w2/4. The total expected payment for the optimal mechanism
is thus 2 · 1/2 · (w1/2 + w2/4 + w2/4) = (w1 + w2)/2. Since w2 > w1, the expected expenses
of the VCG mechanism are strictly higher than those of the optimal mechanism. Therefore,
the VCG mechanism is not optimal. ¤
4 The 2-Dimensional Setting
4.1 Setting and Notation
In contrast to the 1-dimensional setting, both weight and processing time of a job are now
private information of the job. Hence j’s type is the tuple (wj, pj). We restrict atten-
tion to discrete type spaces, i.e., (wj, pj) ∈ Wj × Pj, where Wj = {w1j , . . . , wmjj } with
w1j ≤ · · · ≤ wmjj and Pj = {p1j , . . . , pqjj } with p1j ≤ · · · ≤ pqjj . Let ϕj be the probability
distribution of j’s type, that is, ϕj(w
i
j, p
k
j ) denotes the probability associated with the type
(wij, p
k
j ) for i = 1, . . . ,mj and k = 1, . . . , qj. Both ϕj and Φj are public. Distributions
are independent between agents. Denote by T = Πj∈J(Wj × Pj) the set of all type pro-
files. For any job j, let T−j = Πr 6=j(Wr × Pr) be the set of type profiles of all jobs except
j. Let ϕ be the joint probability distribution of (w1, p1, . . . , wn, pn). Then for type profile
t = (wi11 , p
k1
1 , . . . , w
in
n , p
kn
n ) ∈ T , ϕ(t) = Πnj=1ϕj(wijj , pkjj ). Let t−j and ϕ−j be defined analo-
gously. For (wij, p
k
j ) ∈ Wj × Pj and t−j ∈ T−j, we denote by ((wij, pkj ), t−j) the type profile
where job j has type (wij, p
k
j ) and the types of the other jobs are represented by t−j. De-
note by ESj(f, w
i
j, p
k
j ) :=
∑
t−j∈T−j Sj(f((w
i
j, p
k
j ), t−j))ϕ−j(t−j) the expected waiting time of
job j if he reports type (wij, p
k
j ) and allocation rule f is applied. Denote by Epij(w
i
j, p
k
j ) :=
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∑
t−j∈T−j pij((w
i
j, p
k
j ), t−j)ϕ−j(t−j) the expected payment to j.
We assume that an agent can only report a processing time that is not lower than his
true processing time and that a job is processed for his reported processing time. This is
a natural assumption, since a job can add unnecessary work to achieve a longer processing
time, but reporting a shorter processing time can easily be punished by preempting the job
after the declared processing time (before it is actually finished).
Note that by regarding the processing time as private information, we introduce informa-
tional externalities: job j has a different valuation for a schedule if the processing time (and
hence the type) of a job scheduled before j changes. In this regard, our model differs from
the 2-dimensional auction model studied in Malakhov and Vohra (2007).
4.2 Bayes-Nash Implementability and the Type Graph
Definition 5 A mechanism (f, pi) is called Bayes-Nash incentive compatible if for every
agent j and every two types (wi1j , p
k1
j ) and (w
i2
j , p
k2
j ) with i1, i2 ∈ {1, . . . ,mj}, k1, k2 ∈
{1, . . . , qj}, k1 ≤ k2,
Epij(w
i1
j , p
k1
j )− wi1j ESj(f, wi1j , pk1j ) ≥ Epij(wi2j , pk2j )− wi
1
j ESj(f, w
i2
j , p
k2
j ) (2)
under the assumption that all agents apart from j report truthfully.
Note that by defining the incentive constraints only for k1 ≤ k2, we account for the fact that
agents can only overstate their processing time, but cannot understate it.
In order to ensure individual rationality, again add a dummy type tdj to the type space for
every agent j, and let ESj(f, t
d
j ) = 0 and Epij(t
d
j ) = 0 for all j ∈ J . As in the 1-dimensional
case, the dummy types together with the mentioned extra incentive constraints guarantee
that individual rationality is satisfied along with the incentive constraints. Sometimes, it will
be convenient to write (w
mj+1
j , p
k
j ) for some k ∈ {1, . . . , qj} instead of tdj .
In the 2-dimensional setting, the type graph Tf of agent j has node set Wj × Pj and
contains an arc from any node (wi1j , p
k1
j ) to every other node (w
i2
j , p
k2
j ) with i ∈ {1, . . . ,mj},
i2 ∈ {1, . . . ,mj + 1}, k ∈ {1, . . . , qj}, k1 ≤ k2 of length
`(i1k1)(i2k2) = w
i1
j [ESj(f, w
i2
j , p
k2
j )− ESj(f, wi1j , pk1j )].
Note that we have arcs only in direction of increasing processing times, since agents can only
overstate their processing time. Furthermore, every node has an arc to the dummy type, but
there are no outgoing arcs from the dummy type.
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Similar as in Malakhov and Vohra (2007), one can show that for monotonic allocation rules
some arcs in the type graph are not necessary, since the corresponding incentive constraints
are implied by others. We first give the definition of monotonicity in the 2-dimensional setting
and then formulate a lemma which reduces the set of necessary incentive constraints.
Definition 6 An allocation rule f satisfies monotonicity w.r.t. weights if for every agent
j ∈ J and fixed pkj ∈ Pj, wi1j < wi2j implies that ESj(f, wi1j , pkj ) ≥ ESj(f, wi2j , pkj ).
Lemma 2 Let f be an allocation rule satisfying monotonicity w.r.t. weights. For any agent
j, the following constraints imply all other incentive constraints:
Epij(wij , p
k
j )− wijESj(f, wij , pkj ) ≥ Epij(wi+1j , pkj )− wijESj(f, wi+1j , pkj ) (3)
for i ∈ {1, . . . ,mj}, k ∈ {1, . . . , qj}
Epij(wi+1j , p
k
j )− wi+1j ESj(f, wi+1j , pkj ) ≥ Epij(wij , pkj )− wi+1j ESj(f, wij , pkj ) (4)
for i ∈ {1, . . . ,mj − 1}, k ∈ {1, . . . , qj}
Epij(wij , p
k
j )− wijESj(f, wij , pkj ) ≥ Epij(wij , pk+1j )− wijESj(f, wij , pk+1j ) (5)
for i ∈ {1, . . . ,mj}, k ∈ {1, . . . , qj − 1}
Proof. For any i1, i2, i3 ∈ {1, . . . ,mj + 1},i1 < i2 < i3, and any k ∈ {1, . . . , qj} the constraint
Epij(w
i1
j , p
k
j )− wi1j ESj(f, wi1j , pkj ) ≥ Epij(wi3j , pkj )− wi1j ESj(f, wi3j , pkj )
is implied by
Epij(w
i1
j , p
k
j )− wi1j ESj(f, wi1j , pkj ) ≥ Epij(wi2j , pkj )− wi1j ESj(f, wi2j , pkj )
and
Epij(w
i2
j , p
k
j )− wi2j ESj(f, wi2j , pkj ) ≥ Epij(wi3j , pkj )− wi2j ESj(f, wi3j , pkj ).
In fact, adding up the latter two constraints yields
Epij(w
i1
j , p
k
j )− wi1j ESj(f, wi1j , pkj )
≥ Epij(wi3j , pkj ) + wi2j (ESj(f, wi2j , pkj )− ESj(f, wi3j , pkj ))− wi1j ESj(f, wi2j , pkj )
≥ Epij(wi3j , pkj ) + wi1j (ESj(f, wi2j , pkj )− ESj(f, wi3j , pkj ))− wi1j ESj(f, wi2j , pkj )
= Epij(w
i3
j , p
k
j )− wi1j ESj(f, wi3j , pkj ),
where the second inequality follows from monotonicity and wi1j < w
i2
j . Note that everything
remains true if the dummy type is involved, i.e., if (wi3j , p
k
j ) = (w
mj+1
j , p
k
j ) = t
d
j . These
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arguments imply that all constraints of the type
Epij(w
i1
j , p
k
j )− wi1j ESj(f, wi1j , pkj ) ≥ Epij(wi2j , pkj )− wi1j ESj(f, wi2j , pkj ) (6)
are implied by the subset of constraints where i2 = i1 + 1.
A similar effect can be shown for the “reverse” incentive constraints, i.e., the above
constraints for i3 < i2 < i1, where i1, i2, i3 ∈ {1, . . . ,mj}. Again, out of all constraints of the
type
Epij(w
i1
j , p
k
j )− wi1j ESj(f, wi1j , pkj ) ≥ Epij(wi2j , pkj )− wi1j ESj(f, wi2j , pkj ), (7)
only those with i2 = i1 − 1 are necessary.
Similarly, out of all constraints of the type
Epij(w
i
j, p
k1
j )− wijESj(f, wij, pk1j ) ≥ Epij(wij, pk2j )− wijESj(f, wij, pk2j ), (8)
for i ∈ {1, . . . ,mj}, k1, k2 ∈ {1, . . . , qj}, k1 < k2 only those with k2 = k1 + 1 are necessary.
For any types (wi1j , p
k1
j ),(w
i2
j , p
k2
j ) with i1 < i2 and k1 < k2 the corresponding “diagonal”
constraint
Epij(w
i1
j , p
k1
j )− wi1j ESj(f, wi1j , pk1j ) ≥ Epij(wi2j , pk2j )− wi1j ESj(f, wi2j , pk2j )
follows by adding up the corresponding constraints of type (8) and (6)
Epij(w
i1
j , p
k1
j )− wi1j ESj(f, wi1j , pk1j ) ≥ Epij(wi1j , pk2j )− wi1j ESj(f, wi1j , pk2j )
and
Epij(w
i1
j , p
k2
j )− wi1j ESj(f, wi1j , pk2j ) ≥ Epij(wi2j , pk2j )− wi1j ESj(f, wi2j , pk2j ).
For any (wi1j , p
k1
j ),(w
i2
j , p
k2
j ) with i2 < i1 and k1 < k2, the corresponding “diagonal” constraint
follows by adding up the appropriate constraints of type (8) and (7). ¤
Lemma 2 is in fact a generalization of decomposition monotonicity as discussed for the
1-dimensional case.
We define the reduced type graph of agent j, which contains only arcs that are necessary
in the sense of Lemma 2. These arcs are:
• an arc from type (wij, pkj ) to (wi+1j , pkj ) for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,mj} and k ∈ {1, . . . , qj}
• an arc from type (wi+1j , pkj ) to (wij, pkj ) for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,mj − 1} and k ∈ {1, . . . , qj}
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• an arc from type (wij, pkj ) to (wij, pk+1j ) for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,mj} and k ∈ {1, . . . , qj − 1}.
A sketch of the reduced type graph is given in Figure 1. Expected payments correspond to
node potentials in the reduced type graph. Whenever we refer to the type graph Tf for a
monotonic allocation rule f in the following, the reduced type graph is meant. The reduced
type graph comes handy particularly when considering our (counter) examples in the next
subsection.
w1j , p
1
j
w
mj
j , p
1
j
w
mj
j , p
qj
j
w1j , p
qj
j
tdj
Figure 1: reduced type graph
We finally give the characterization of Bayes-Nash incentive compatible allocation rules
for the 2-dimensional setting.
Theorem 3 An allocation rule f is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible in the 2-dimensional
setting if and only if it satisfies monotonicity with respect to weights.
Proof. Implementability implies monotonicity as before. The claim reduces to showing
that in the (reduced) type graph of any agent j the non-negative cycle property is equivalent
to the non-negative two-cycle property. After the reduction, every cycle in Tf consists of
a finite number of two-cycles. Hence the non-negative cycle property is equivalent to the
non-negative two-cycle property.
¤
4.3 On Optimal Mechanisms
We start by reviewing an approach to two-dimensional optimal mechanism design studied
in Malakhov and Vohra (2007). Here, the authors regard a multi-item auction, where each
agent’s type (i, j) is given by a marginal valuation i per item and a capacity j. Above that
capacity, the agent has zero valuation for each additional item. Agents can only overstate
their capacity. The goal is revenue maximization. Bayes-Nash implementability is equivalent
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to the expected amount of items allocated to an agent being monotone in his reported value
for i. Malakhov and Vohra (2007) use the type graph approach as follows.
First, they regard a subset of all allocation rules - namely those that are monotone in
j as well. It turns out that all those rules have the same shortest path tree, namely the
“up-first-then-right” tree (see Figure 2 for a 3× 3 example).
1, 1 3, 1
3, 31, 3
td
Figure 2: up-first-then-right tree
Second, the path lengths in this tree yield optimal payments to every job for every type.
From that, the optimal revenue for a particular allocation rule is obtained as closed formula
in terms of modified marginal valuations.
Third, the obtained expression for the revenue is maximized over all allocation rules. The
resulting allocation rule is a modification of the efficient allocation rule. In addition, this
rule turns out to be monotone in j, similar as in the proof of Theorem 2. Hence, its shortest
path tree is the up-first-then-right tree.
In the last step, the monotonicity assumption in j is relaxed as follows. For any allocation
rule – not necessarily monotone in j – the up-first-then-right tree yields an individual upper
bound on the revenue for that specific allocation rule. By maximizing the individual upper
bounds over all allocation rules, a global upper bound for the revenue is achieved. But this
upper bound is assumed by the modified efficient allocation rule derived before, which yields
hence an optimal mechanism.
It turns out that the described approach is doomed to fail in our setting. Especially,
one cannot find any tree B ⊆ Tf – as e.g. the up-first-then-right tree above – such that
the allocation rule optimizing the expected total payment computed on the basis of B in
turn has B as a shortest path tree. Note that the approach described above and also our
approach for the 1-dimensional setting focus on one agent and the corresponding type graph.
Hence any allocation rule derived by the described approach is necessarily a modified Smith’s
rule with modified weights that can be computed from the characteristics (type report and
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distribution) of the agent itself similar as in Lemma 1. Such an allocation rule satisfies the
following IIA property.
Definition 7 We say that an allocation rule f satisfies independence of irrelevant alterna-
tives (IIA) if the relative order of any two jobs j1 and j2 is the same in the schedules f(t1)
and f(t2) for any two type profiles t1, t2 ∈ T that differ only in the types of agents from
J \ {j1, j2}.
In other words, the relative order of two jobs is independent of all other jobs. For the 2-d
setting, this is not necessarily the case for optimal mechanisms.
Theorem 4 The optimal allocation rule for the 2-dimensional setting does in general not
satisfy IIA.
Proof. Consider the following instance with three jobs. Job 1 has type (1, 1), job 2 has
type (2, 2) and job 3 has type space {1.9, 2} × {1, 2}. The probabilities for job 3’s types are
ϕ3(1.9, 1) = 0.8, ϕ3(2, 2) = 0.2 and ϕ3(1.9, 2) = ϕ3(2, 1) = 0 respectively. We will show that
the best allocation rule that satisfies IIA achieves a minimum expected total payment of at
least 5.6, whereas there exists an allocation rule – violating IIA – with an expected total
payment of 4.88. The following argumentation would still work if we assumed small positive
probabilities for types (1.9, 2) and (2, 1) as well, but everything would become much more
technical.
There are six possible schedules for three jobs, where we denote e.g. by 312 the schedule
where job 3 comes first and job 2 last. There are only two cases that occur with positive
probability: job 3 has type (1.9, 1), which we refer to as case a, and job 3 has type (2, 2),
which we refer to as case b. An allocation rule that satisfies IIA must schedule job 1 and 2 in
the same relative order in case a and b. Therefore, any such rule must either choose a schedule
from {123, 132, 312} or from {213, 231, 321} in both cases. As an example, we compute a lower
bound on the optimal payment Pmin(f) for the case where f chooses schedule 123 in case a
and schedule 132 in case b. Since there is only one possible type for job 1 and 2, only individual
rationality matters for the optimal payments to those jobs and hence pif1 (1, 1) = 0 and
pif2 (2, 2) = 2(0.8 ·1+0.2 · (1+2)) = 2.8. For job 3, we take individual rationality into account
as well as the incentive constraint pif3 (1.9, 1) − 1.9 · ES3(1.9, 1) ≥ pif3 (2, 2) − 1.9 · ES3(2, 2).
While individual rationality requires pif3 (1.9, 1) ≥ 1.9 · 3 = 5.7 and pif3 (2, 2) ≥ 2, the latter is
equivalent to pif3 (1.9, 1) ≥ pif3 (2, 2) + 3.8. Therefore, pif3 (2, 2) ≥ 2 and pif3 (1.9, 1) ≥ 5.8. Hence
Pmin(f) ≥ 2.8 + 0.8 · 5.8 + 0.2 · 2 = 7.84. Note that this is only a lower bound, since for the
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exact value of Pmin(f), we must additionally consider the incentive constraints that result
from the two types (1.9, 2) and (2, 1), which have zero probability, but are in the type space
of job 3.
In total, there are 18 allocation rules that satisfy IIA. We list the corresponding lower
bounds (LB) on Pmin(f) in the following table.
f(a) f(b) pif1 pi
f
2 LB pi
f
3 (1.9, 1) LB pi
f
3 (2, 2) LB P
min(f)
123 123 0 2 6 6 8
123 132 0 2.8 5.8 2 7.84
123 312 0.4 2.8 5.7 0 7.76
132 123 0 3.6 2.2 6 6.56
132 132 0 4.4 2 2 6.4
132 312 0.4 4.4 1.9 0 6.32
312 123 0.8 3.6 0.3 6 5.84
312 132 0.8 4.4 0.1 2 5.68
312 312 1.2 4.4 0 0 5.6
123 123 2 0 6 6 8
123 123 2.4 0 5.9 4 7.92
123 123 2.4 0.8 5.7 0 7.76
123 123 2.8 0 4.1 6 7.28
123 123 3.2 0 4 4 7.2
123 123 3.2 0.8 3.8 0 7.04
123 123 2.8 1.6 0.3 6 5.84
123 123 3.2 1.6 0.2 4 5.76
123 123 3.2 2.4 0 0 5.6
Hence, 5.6 is a lower bound for the expected total payment made by any IIA mechanism.
On the other hand, regard the allocation rule that chooses schedule 132 in case a and schedule
231 in case b. We extend the allocation rule to the zero probability type such that it chooses
schedule 132 for type (2, 1) and schedule 231 for type (1.9, 2). Clearly, this allocation rule
violates IIA. The optimal payments to job 1 and 2 are pif1 (1, 1) = 0.8 and pi
f
2 (2, 2) = 1.6
respectively. For the optimal payment to job 3, we depict the type graph with associated
arc lengths in Figure 3. The shortest path lengths from (1.9, 1) and (2, 2) to the dummy
node are −2.1 and −4, respectively. Hence, pif3 (1.9, 1) = 2.1 and pif3 (2, 2) = 4. Consequently,
Pmin(f) = 0.8 + 1.6 + 0.8 · 2.1 + 0.2 · 4 = 4.88. This proves the claim. ¤
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Figure 3: type graph job 3
Theorem 4 shows that any kind of priority based algorithm or list scheduling algorithm
where the priority of a job can be computed from the characteristics of the job itself cannot
be optimal in general. Moreover, the type graph approach must fail, since it focusses on a
single agent. Hence, optimal mechanism design for our 2-dimensional setting is considerably
more complicated than for the 1-dimensional setting and for traditional auction settings as
described in Myerson (1981) and Malakhov and Vohra (2007). One explanation for this com-
plication may lie in the fact that the 2-d setting considered here in fact entails informational
externalities, as opposed to the auction setting in (Malakhov and Vohra 2007). On the other
hand, the informational externalities introduced by private processing times are not the only
cause for complications in the 2-dimensional setting: Consider the 1-dimensional setting,
where only the processing times are private, but the weights are public information. It turns
out that all allocation rules are implementable, even when we allow that jobs understate
their processing times. The optimal payment to a job j that reports processing time pkj is
equal to wjESj(f, p
k
j ), and therefore the total payment to jobs for allocation rule f is equal
to Pmin(f) =
∑
j∈J
∑qj
k=1 ϕj(p
k
j )wjESj(f, p
k
j ). This is minimized by Smith’s rule.
When there are only two agents present, then IIA is trivially satisfied. Recall that in
the 1-dimensional case the optimal mechanism is efficient for symmetric agents and regular
distributions and that the uniform distribution is regular. This is contrasted by the following
theorem.
Theorem 5 Even for two symmetric agents, 2× 2-type spaces and uniform probability dis-
tributions, the optimal mechanism is not efficient.
Proof. Consider the following example with two jobs, W1 = W2 = {1, 2} and P1 = P2 =
{1, 2}. We assume that ϕ1(i, k) = ϕ2(i, k) = 14 for i, k ∈ {1, 2}. On one hand, consider the
efficient allocation rule fe, which schedules the job with higher weight over processing time
ratio first. On the other hand, regard the so-called w-rule, fw, that schedules the job with
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Figure 4: type graphs for the w-rule for jobs 1 and 2
the higher weight first. In case of ties, both rules schedule job 1 first. The expected start
times are listed below.
ES1(fw, 1, 1) = ES1(fw, 1, 2) = 3/4
ES1(fw, 2, 1) = ES1(fw, 2, 2) = 0
ES1(fe, 1, 1) = ES1(fe, 2, 2) = 1/4,
ES1(fe, 1, 2) = 1,
ES1(fe, 2, 1) = 0,
ES2(fw, 1, 1) = ES2(fw, 1, 2) = 3/2
ES2(fw, 2, 1) = ES2(fw, 2, 2) = 3/4
ES2(fe, 1, 1) = ES2(fe, 2, 2) = 1,
ES2(fe, 1, 2) = 3/2,
ES2(fe, 2, 1) = 1/4.
The type graphs corresponding to fw for job 1 and 2 respectively are shown in Figure 4.
From this, the optimal payments can be computed as:
pifw1 (2, 1) = pi
fw
1 (2, 2) = 0,
pifw1 (1, 1) = pi
fw
1 (1, 2) = 3/4,
pifw2 (2, 1) = pi
fw
2 (2, 2) = 3/2,
pifw2 (1, 1) = pi
fw
2 (1, 2) = 9/4.
Hence the (minimum) total expected payment for the w-rule is:
Pmin(fw) =
1
4
∑
j
∑
(i,k)
pifwj (i, k) = 9/4.
The type graphs corresponding to fe for agent 1 and 2 respectively are shown in Figure 5.
From this, the node potentials that minimize payment can be computed as:
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Figure 5: type graphs for the efficient rule for job 1 and 2
pife1 (1, 1) = pi
fe
1 (2, 2) = 1/2,
pife1 (2, 1) = 0
pife1 (1, 2) = 5/4,
pife2 (1, 1) = pi
fe
2 (2, 2) = 2,
pife2 (1, 2) = 5/2,
pife2 (2, 1) = 1/2.
Hence the (minimum) total expected payment in the efficient rule is:
Pmin(fe) =
1
4
∑
j
∑
(i,k)
pij(i, k) = 37/16.
Hence, Pmin(fe) > P
min(fw). This is even true if we break ties randomly. Thus, the efficient
allocation is for some instances dominated by at least the w-rule and consequently does
not correspond to the optimal mechanism even in the most symmetric case possible in this
setting. ¤
5 Optimal Mechanisms for the Continuous Setting
For this section, we impose the following changes on the discrete setting described in the
previous sections. For every job j, let the weight wj be a continuous random variable with
publicly known support [mj,Mj], probability density function ϕj, and cumulative distribution
function Φj. Probability distributions are assumed to be independent between jobs. We will
prove some results for general probability distributions and others for uniform distribution
of weights. The latter has Φj(x) = (x − mj)/(Mj − mj) and ϕj(x) = 1/(Mj − mj) for all
j ∈ J and x ∈ [mj,Mj]. Again, the actual weight is private information of an agent, whereas
the processing time pj of an agent j is fixed and common knowledge. We will refer to the
definitions of Section 2, unless we give a new definition here.
In the following, we show that the characterization of Bayes-Nash implementable alloca-
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tion rules from the previous section also applies to the continuous case. In addition, revenue
equivalence holds. We show that Smith’s rule with respect to certain modified weights and
payments computed from the network approach is again an optimal mechanism under regu-
larity. If the regularity condition is satisfied and agents are symmetric, then this mechanism
is efficient, as before. The regularity condition is satisfied for instance by the uniform distri-
bution. If mj = 0 for j = 1, . . . , n and if the weights of all agents are distributed uniformly
over their respective (not necessarily equal) intervals [0,Mj], then this optimal mechanism is
even efficient if the processing times differ among agents.
Hartline and Karlin (2007) discuss optimal mechanism design for a similar setting as the
continuous setting at hand. They derive optimal mechanisms subject to dominant strategy
implementability and thus mechanisms that are optimal in a more restricted class of mecha-
nisms. The allocation rule of the optimal mechanism that we derive turns out to be dominant
strategy implementable as well, but is optimal within the larger class of Bayes-Nash incen-
tive compatible mechanisms. Strictly speaking, our results are therefore not implied by the
results in Hartline and Karlin (2007). On the other hand, looking at the techniques de-
scribed in Hartline and Karlin (2007), our optimal mechanism could be derived using these
techniques, too. Although our optimal payments and regularity conditions differ from those
in Hartline and Karlin (2007), these differences are completely due to the fact that in our
case agents are paid by the mechanism and therefore individual rationality requires adding
different constants.
5.1 Bayes-Nash Implementability and Revenue Equivalence
We make use of the type graph as before. Note that for continuous distribution of weights, the
type graph has uncountably many nodes. We do not introduce an extra dummy node here,
but we will account for individual rationality explicitly when deriving optimal mechanisms.
In the continuous case, the following holds:
Theorem 6 An allocation rule f is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible in the continuous set-
ting if and only if it satisfies monotonicity.
The proof of Theorem 6 is almost identical to the proof of Theorem 1. Note that even
in an infinite type graph we only need to consider finite cycles. We do not repeat the proof
here.
Theorem 7 In the continuous setting, every Bayes-Nash implementable allocation rule f
satisfies revenue equivalence.
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Proof. We use the characterization of revenue equivalence given in Heydenreich, Mu¨ller,
Uetz, and Vohra (2008). Fix a Bayes-Nash implementable allocation rule f and agent j and
consider the type graph Tf . Let w, z ∈ [mj,Mj] be two types of agent j. Using the same
notation as before, we derive the following for the distance from w to z.
dist(w, z) = inf
(w=a0,...,akp=z)∈P(w,z)
kp−1∑
i=0
`aiai+1
= inf
(w=a0<···<akp=z)∈P(w,z)
kp−1∑
i=0
`aiai+1
= inf
(w=a0<···<akp=z)∈P(w,z)
kp−1∑
i=0
ai[ESj(f, ai+1)− ESj(f, ai)]
= inf
(w=a0<···<akp=z)∈P(w,z)
(
−wESj(f, w) + zESj(f, z) +
kp∑
i=2
(ai−1 − ai)ESj(f, ai)
)
= −wESj(f, w) + zESj(f, z)−
∫ z
w
ESj(f, x)dx.
Here, we use decomposition monotonicity and the nonnegative two-cycle property for the
second equality. The last equality follows from decomposition monotonicity and the fact
that ESj(f, ·) is a non-increasing function and therefore Riemann integrable. Similarly, we
get
dist(z, w) = wESj(f, w)− zESj(f, z)−
∫ w
z
ESj(f, x)dx,
and therefore dist(w, z) = −dist(z, w). According to Theorem ??, f satisfies revenue equiv-
alence. ¤
5.2 Optimal Mechanisms
As in the discrete case, we design a mechanism which assigns the payments to agents only
on the basis of their reports, no matter what the announced types of the other agents are
and no matter how therefore the actual allocation looks like. The goal is to minimize the
expected total payment made to jobs.
The following lemma gives payments that minimize the expected total payment made to
jobs for a given allocation rule.
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Lemma 3 For a Bayes-Nash implementable allocation rule f , the payment scheme
pifj (wj) = wjESj(f, wj) +
∫ Mj
wj
ESj(f, x) dx for j ∈ J, wj ∈ [mj,Mj]
is incentive compatible, individual rational and minimizes the expected total payment made
to agents. The expected total payment is then given by
Pmin(f) =
∑
j∈J
∫
W
Sj(f(w))wjϕ(w)dw,
where the modified weights wj are defined as
wj := wj +
Φj(wj)
ϕj(wj)
for wj ∈ [mj,Mj].
Proof. The given payment scheme is equal to
pifj (wj) = −dist(wj,Mj) +MjESj(f,Mj) for j ∈ J, wj ∈ [mj,Mj].
Similar to the previous section, it can easily be checked that this payment scheme satisfies
the incentive constraints. For any allocation rule f , the expected payment to any agent
j ∈ J is fixed up to a constant due to Theorem 7. The constant must be chosen high
enough such that individual rationality is satisfied, but also low enough, such that the total
expected payment is minimized. Observe that the expected utility for type Mj is equal to
−MjES(f,Mj)+Epifj (Mj) = 0, therefore adding a negative constant would violate individual
rationality at type Mj. On the other hand, for any type wj ∈ [mj,Mj], the expected utility
is equal to −wjES(f, wj) + Epifj (wj) =
∫Mj
wj
ESj(f, x) dx ≥ 0, thus individual rationality is
satisfied. Hence, adding a positive constant would make the expected payment non-minimum.
Consequently, the above payment scheme is incentive compatible, individual rational and
minimizes the expected payment for every type of every job. Hence, it also minimizes the
expected total payment to agents.
Next, we derive an expression for the expected total payment.
Pmin(f) =
∑
j∈J
∫ Mj
mj
ϕj(wj)pi
f
j (wj) dwj
=
∑
j∈J
∫ Mj
mj
ϕj(wj) (−dist(wj,Mj) +MjESj(f,Mj)) dwj
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=
∑
j∈J
∫ Mj
mj
ϕj(wj)
(
wjESj(f, wj) +
∫ Mj
wj
ESj(f, x) dx
)
dwj
=
∑
j∈J
∫ Mj
mj
wjESj(f, wj)ϕj(wj) dwj +
∑
j∈J
∫ Mj
mj
∫ Mj
wj
ESj(f, x)ϕj(wj) dx dwj
Recall that Sj(f(wj, w−j)) denotes the start time of job j, when other jobs report w−j and
that W = Πni=1[mj,Mj]. The summands of the first sum can be written as∫ Mj
mj
wjESj(f, wj)ϕj(wj) dwj
=
∫
W
wjSj(f(wj, w−j))ϕ1(w1) . . . ϕj(wj) · · ·ϕn(wn)dw1 · · · dwj . . . dwn
=
∫
W
wjSj(f(w))ϕ(w)dw,
where ϕ(·) is the joint distribution function of all agents. The summands in the second sum
can be rewritten as follows∫ Mj
mj
∫ Mj
wj
ESj(f, x)ϕj(wj) dx dwj
=
∫ Mj
mj
∫ x
mj
ESj(f, x)ϕj(wj) dwj dx
=
∫ Mj
mj
ESj(f, x)Φj(x)dx
=
∫ Mj
mj
ESj(f, wj)Φj(wj)dwj
=
∫
W
Sj(f(wj, w−j))Φj(wj)ϕ1(w1) . . . ϕj−1(wj−1)ϕj+1(wj+1) . . . ϕn(wn)dw1 . . . dwj . . . dwn
=
∫
W
Sj(w)
Φj(wj)
ϕj(wj)
ϕ(w)dw.
Hence, we get for the total payment
Pmin(f) =
∑
j∈J
∫
W
Sj(f(w))
(
wj +
Φj(wj)
ϕj(wj)
)
ϕ(w)dw
=
∑
j∈J
∫
W
Sj(f(w))wjϕ(w)dw,
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where wj := wj + Φj(wj)/ϕj(wj) defines the modified weight for job j. ¤
As in the discrete case, Pmin(f) can be minimized for arbitrary distributions of weights
by applying Smith’s rule with respect to the modified weights. The resulting mechanism will
be Bayes-Nash incentive compatible if the following regularity condition holds.
Definition 8 The regularity condition holds in the continuous case if for j ∈ J and w, z ∈
[mj,Mj], w < z:
w +
Φj(w)
ϕj(w)
≤ z + Φj(z)
ϕj(z)
.
We get the following result.
Theorem 8 Let the modified weights and the payment scheme pif be defined as in Lemma3.
Let f be the allocation rule that schedules jobs in order of non-increasing ratios wj/pj. If
regularity holds, then (f, pif ) is an optimal mechanism.
Proof. As mentioned above, Smith’s rule minimizes
∑
j∈J Sj(f(w))wj for every type pro-
file w ∈ W . Therefore, it also minimizes the total expected payment. As in the discrete
case, the regularity condition ensure that modified weights be non-decreasing in the original
weights. As ESj(wj) is non-increasing in the modified weight wj under Smith’s rule with
respect to modified weights, it is non-increasing in the original weight wj for every j ∈ J if
regularity holds. Hence, under regularity weak monotonicity and consequently Bayes-Nash
implementability is satisfied. ¤
The following theorem gives two important cases, when this optimal mechanism is effi-
cient.
Theorem 9 The optimal mechanism is efficient in the following two cases.
1) Agents are symmetric, i.e., have identically distributed weights and equal processing times
and the regularity condition holds for the distribution functions.
2) Agents’ weights are distributed uniformly over [0,Mj] for j = 1, ..., n. Processing times
can be arbitrary.
Proof. 1) Smith’s rule with respect to modified weights is equivalent to Smith’s rule with
respect to the original weights as in the discrete case. Regularity ensures weak monotonicity
and hence Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility.
2) For the uniform distribution, we get for the virtual weights
w +
Φj(w)
ϕj(w)
= w +
w/Mj
1/Mj
= 2w,
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which is increasing and linear in w and the linear relationship does not depend on the agent.
Hence, Smith’s rule with respect to virtual weights is equivalent to Smith’s rule with respect
to original weights, no matter what the processing times are. ¤
6 Optimal Mechanisms via Standard Auction Formats
After having derived an optimal mechanism for the continuous case, we are interested whether
standard auction formats also yield optimal mechanisms for our scheduling setting. We study
the VCG mechanism and a mechanism that corresponds to the first price auction.
6.1 The Generalized VCG Mechanism
Recall that for the discrete setting, the generalized VCG mechanism was not optimal, even in
cases when the optimal mechanism allocates efficiently. In the continuous setting, however,
revenue equivalence implies that the expected payments to agent j in all Bayes-Nash incentive
compatible mechanisms that allocate efficiently are the same up to a constant. As the optimal
mechanism proposed in Section 5 allocates efficiently in the case of symmetric agents and
regularity, also the VCG mechanism can be used in this case to derive an optimal mechanism
by adding an appropriate constant to the payments of every agent.
Theorem 10 For symmetric agents under regularity, the VCG mechanism with payments
piV CGj (w) = pj
∑
k∈J
σk<σj
wk.
is optimal. Here, σ denotes the efficient schedule.
Proof. Assume symmetric agents with weights identically distributed over [m,M ] accord-
ing to density function ϕ1 and cumulative distribution function Φ1. The distributions are
assumed to satisfy regularity. Without loss of generality, let the processing times be equal to
one. The result already follows from revenue equivalence and the fact that under the VCG
mechanism, any agent with type equal to his maximum possible type M has expected start
time equal to zero and hence zero expected utility, just as in the optimal mechanism from
Section 5.
Nevertheless, we check the equality of the expected payments under the VCG and the
optimal mechanism explicitly for illustrative purposes. Since jobs have equal processing
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times, the VCG mechanism allocates in order of non-increasing weights. The payment made
to an agent j under the VCG mechanism is the sum of the weights of all agents processed
before j. To derive the expected payment to agent j announcing type wj, we notice that any
other agent k is scheduled before j if k’s weight x is larger than wj. In this case, x is paid to
j. The expected payment at type wj is therefore
EpiV CGj (wj) = (n− 1)
∫ M
wj
xϕ1(x)dx.
In the optimal mechanism proposed in Section 5, the payment for type wj and any w−j is
equal to
pifj (wj, w−j) = wjESj(f, wj) +
∫ M
wj
ESj(f, x)dx.
The start time when announcing type wj is a binomially distributed random variable with
parameters n− 1 and 1−Φ1(wj), as the placement of any of the n− 1 other jobs in front of
j can be seen as a binomial trial with success probability 1−Φ1(wj). The start time counts
the number of ”successes”. Therefore, ESj(f, wj) = (n − 1)(1 − Φ1(wj)). We get for the
payments
Epifj (wj) = wj(n− 1)(1− Φ1(wj)) + (n− 1)
∫ M
wj
(1− Φ1(x))dx
= wj(n− 1)(1− Φ1(wj)) + (n− 1)
∫ M
wj
∫ M
x
ϕ1(y) dy dx
= wj(n− 1)(1− Φ1(wj)) + (n− 1)
∫ M
wj
∫ y
wj
ϕ1(y) dx dy
= wj(n− 1)(1− Φ1(wj)) + (n− 1)
∫ M
wj
ϕ1(y)(y − wj) dy
= wj(n− 1)(1− Φ1(wj))− (n− 1)wj(1− Φ1(wj)) + (n− 1)
∫ M
wj
yϕ1(y) dy
= (n− 1)
∫ M
wj
xϕ1(x) dx
= EpiV CGj (wj).
Hence, Epifj (wj) = Epi
V CG
j (wj) for all j ∈ J and all types wj. Therefore, the total expected
payments of the optimal and the VCGmechanism are equal, too. Hence, the VCG mechanism
is optimal. ¤
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Remarkably, the payment under pif depends only on the reported type of an agent and is
constant over all reports of the other agents’ and therefore over all allocations. In contrast,
piV CG depends only on the allocation and not on the specific report of the agent. Nevertheless,
both yield the same expected payments.
6.2 The First-Price Equivalent
In the first price auction, the highest bidder wins the object and has to pay the amount of
his bid. In this auction, truthful reporting does not necessarily maximize a bidder’s expected
utility. On the other hand, there is a strictly increasing and differentiable bidding function
β such that bidding according to β for all agents is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. This result
can e.g. be found in Myerson (1991). Especially, for uniformly distributed valuations for the
object, the bidding function β scales the true valuation down by a factor of (n− 1)/n.
We do a similar analysis for the continuous case of our scheduling problem. For symmetric
agents, we derive a strictly increasing and differentiable function β yielding a symmetric
Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which all agents report according to β. From that, it is easy to
construct another optimal mechanism for the continuous case. We furthermore show that for
two agents with different processing times, there is no such function β.
The Mechanism for the Symmetric Case. Suppose, the jobs in J are symmet-
ric and their weights are drawn independently and identically distributed from the interval
[0,M ] with probability density function ϕ1 and cumulative distribution function Φ1. Suppose
ϕ1(·) > 0 on [0,M ]. Processing times are all equal to one. The proposed mechanism (f, pi)
works as follows. Schedule jobs in order of non-increasing weights and pay to each job an
amount equal to his actual start time times his announced weight. A bidding function β is
a function β : [0,M ]→ R+. Recall the definition of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
Definition 9 Reporting according to β : [0,M ] → R+ is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium if any
agent j with weight wj maximizes his expected utility by reporting β(wj) given that all other
agents report according to β, too.
Let us assume that there is a symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which agents report
according to the same strictly increasing and differentiable bidding function β. We will first
derive a functional form for β and then show that reporting according to β is a Bayes-Nash
equilibrium.
Fix agent j with actual weight wj and suppose that every other agent k with true weight
wk reports β(wk). Suppose, j reports some weight bj. Then his expected utility is (bj − wj)
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times his expected start time. If j bids bj ≤ β(0) then he will get the last position with
probability one and therefore has utility (n− 1)(bj − wj) ≤ (n− 1)(β(0)− wj). This utility
is maximized at β(0) and j will never bid strictly less than β(0). Reporting more than
β(M) leads to an expected start time of 0 for agent j and hence to an expected utility of
0. Reporting any wj ≤ bj ≤ β(M) leads to a non-negative expected utility. Hence we can
assume bj ≤ β(M) without loss of generality. Consequently, β(0) ≤ bj ≤ β(M). As β is
continuous and strictly increasing, we can compute β−1(bj) =: w˜j. Scheduling in order of
non-increasing reports β(wk) is equivalent to scheduling in order of non-increasing reports wk,
as β is increasing. Therefore, j’s start time when reporting bj = β(w˜j) is again a binomially
distributed random variable with parameters n− 1 and 1− Φ1(w˜j) and expected value
ESj(f, bj) = (n− 1)(1− Φ1(w˜j)).
Job j’s expected utility is then equal to
(bj − wj)(n− 1)(1− Φ1(w˜j)) = (bj − wj)(n− 1)(1− Φ1(β−1(bj))).
Differentiating with respect to bj yields
(n− 1)(1− Φ1(β−1(bj)))− (n− 1)(bj − wj)ϕ1(β
−1(bj))
β′(β−1(bj))
.
The expected utility should be maximized at bj = β(wj). We apply the first order condition.
(1− Φ1(wj))− (β(wj)− wj)ϕ1(wj)
β′(wj)
= 0
⇔ β′(wj)(1− Φ1(wj))− β(wj)ϕ1(wj) = −wjϕ1(wj).
This should be true for any true weight x ∈ [0,M ]. Hence, we can write for x ∈ [0,M ]
d
dx
(β(x)(1− Φ1(x))) = −xϕ1(x).
Integrating both sides from wj to M yields
β(M)(1− Φ1(M))− β(wj)(1− Φ1(wj)) = −
∫ M
wj
xϕ1(x)dx
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⇔ β(wj) = 1
1− Φ1(wj)
∫ M
wj
xϕ1(x)dx.
The report β(M) is obtained by taking the limit limx→M β(x). Note that β is differentiable
and strictly increasing if ϕ is strictly positive on [0,M ]. Unlike in the first price auction, the
bidding function is independent of the number of agents.
Next, we show that agents indeed maximize their expected utility by reporting according
to β.
Theorem 11 Let f be the allocation rule that schedules in order of non-increasing reported
weights. Let pi be such, that every agent gets a payment equal to his announced weight times
his actual start time. Then, in the mechanism (f, pi), reporting according to β : [0,M ]→ R+,
with
β(wj) =
1
1− Φ1(wj)
∫ M
wj
xϕ1(x)dx.
is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Fix agent j with true weight wj and suppose that all other agents report according to
β. We show that reporting β(wj) indeed maximizes j’s expected utility. Suppose, j reports
bj. Let Euj(bj, wj) be the expected utility for j when reporting bj while having actual weight
wj. As we already have seen, there is no loss of generality in assuming β(0) ≤ bj ≤ β(M).
Hence, β(w˜j) = bj for some w˜j ∈ [0,M ]. The expected utility from reporting β(w˜j) is equal
to
Euj(bj, wj) = (β(w˜j)− wj)(n− 1)(1− Φ1(w˜j))
⇔ 1
n− 1Euj(bj, wj) =
∫ M
w˜j
xϕ1(x)dx− wj(1− Φ1(w˜j))
= [xΦ1(x)]
M
w˜j
−
∫ M
w˜j
Φ1(x)dx− wj(1− Φ1(w˜j))
= M − w˜jΦ1(w˜j)−
∫ M
w˜j
Φ1(x)dx− wj(1− Φ1(w˜j))
= (M − wj) + (wj − w˜j)Φ1(w˜j)−
∫ M
w˜j
Φ1(x)dx.
Hence,
1
n− 1[Euj(β(wj), wj)− Euj(β(w˜j), wj)] =
∫ wj
w˜j
Φ1(x)dx− (wj − w˜j)Φ1(w˜j) ≥ 0.
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This completes the proof. ¤
We give two examples of explicit bidding functions for the exponential and the uniform
distribution.
Example 4 (Exponential distribution) Let Φ1(w) = 1 − e−λw for some λ > 0. The
interval is [0,∞). Then
β(w) =
1
e−λw
λ
∫ ∞
w
xe−λxdx
=
1
e−λw
(
[−xe−λx]∞w +
∫ ∞
w
e−λxdx
)
=
1
e−λw
(
we−λw +
[
−e
−λx
λ
]∞
w
)
= w +
1
λ
.
Thus, if weights are exponentially distributed, an agent has to add the mean weight 1/λ to
his actual weight in the equilibrium.
Example 5 (Uniform distribution) Let agents’ weights be uniformly distributed over [0,M ].
That is ϕ1(w) = 1/M and Φ1(w) = w/M . Thus,
β(w) =
1
1− w
M
∫ M
w
x
M
dx =
1
M − w
[
x2
2
]M
w
=
M + w
2
.
Taking the limit w →M yields additionally β(M) =M .
Hence, for uniform distributions, an agent reports the mean of his true weight and the
maximum weight M .
From the above analysis, we get the following Bayes-Nash incentive compatible and op-
timal mechanism.
Theorem 12 Allocating jobs in order of non-increasing reported weights and paying to job
j with report wj and realized start time Sj the payment Sjβ(wj) is a Bayes-Nash incentive
compatible and optimal mechanism.
Proof. As β is increasing, scheduling jobs in order of non-increasing β(wj) is equivalent
to scheduling in order of non-increasing wj. If bidding according to β is a Bayes-Nash
equilibrium in the mechanism where a job j bidding wj is paid Sjwj, then truthful bidding
is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the mechanism where j is paid Sjβ(wj). Therefore, the
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mechanism proposed in the theorem is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible. As the allocation is
again efficient, expected payments for each type coincide up to a constant with the expected
payments of the VCG mechanism and with those of the optimal mechanism described in the
previous two sections. The constant is zero, as also in this mechanism, a job with maximum
weight M has zero expected start time, zero payment and hence zero utility, just as in the
VCG mechanism and the optimal mechanism from Section 5. ¤
A Negative Result for Unequal Processing Times. In the case with two agents
that have unequal processing times, there is no bidding function β according to which both
agents report in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 13 Suppose, there are two agents, whose weights are continuous random variables
with equal support [0,M ]. If p1 6= p2, then there is no continuous bidding function β : [0,M ]→
R+ according to which both agents report in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. That is, there is no
symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
Note that the theorem holds for arbitrary continuous random weights with support [0,M ].
Especially, we do not need to assume that weights are identically distributed.
Proof. Without loss of generality let p2 < p1. Assume β is a continuous equilibrium bidding
function. Let agent 2 bid according to β and look at agent 1. Let
b1 = min
{(
1
2
+
p1
2p2
)
β(0), β(M)
}
,
then b1 ∈ [β(0), β(M)]. There exists w1 ∈ [0,M ] with β(w1) = b1, as β is continuous. Then
β(w1) = b1 ≤
(
1
2
+
p1
2p2
)
β(0)
⇔ p2β(w1) ≤
(p2
2
+
p1
2
)
β(0) < p1β(0)
⇔ β(w1)
p1
<
β(0)
p2
.
Bidding any b with b/p1 ≤ β(0)/p2 results in an expected start time of p2 for agent 1.
The expected utility is then (b − w1)p2 which is strictly larger at b = (p1/p2)β(0) than at
b = β(w1) < (p1/p2)β(0). Thus, β does not maximize the expected utility at w1. ¤
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7 Discussion
We have seen that the graph theoretic approach is an intuitive tool for optimal mechanism
design and yields a closed formula for the optimal mechanism in the 1-dimensional case. The
results parallel Myerson’s results for single item auctions; although there are differences. It
is not hard to see that the optimal allocation rule – Smith’s rule with respect to modified
weights – is even dominant strategy implementable, with the same total expected payment
for the mechanism. In order to obtain a dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism,
only the payment scheme has to be defined appropriately for each reported type profile.
In the discrete case, efficient mechanisms can be arbitrarily bad with respect to the total
payment made to agents. For symmetric agents, however, the optimal mechanism is efficient.
Even so, the payments of the generalized VCG mechanism can still be non-optimal. In the
continuous case, revenue equivalence holds and the generalized VCG mechanism as well as a
mechanism derived from the first price auction are optimal in those cases where the optimal
mechanisms allocates efficiently.
Moreover, we have seen that in the two-dimensional case the canonical approach does not
work and that optimal mechanism design seems to be considerably more complicated than in
the traditional auction models. We leave it as an open problem to identify (closed formulae
for) optimal mechanisms for the 2-d case. It is conceivable, however, that closed formulae
don’t exist.
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